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Abstract: 
This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for 
outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of 
understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually 
facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other 
agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint 
responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is 
essentially joint. Second, the agents involved in these cases are not aware of each other's 
existence and do not form a social group. This undermines attempts to understand joint 
responsibility in terms of actual or possible joint action or joint intentions, or in terms of other 
social ties. Instead, it is argued that intuitions about joint responsibility are best understood 
given the Explanation Hypothesis, according to which a group of agents are seen as jointly 
responsible for outcomes that are suitably explained by their motivational structures: 
something bad happened because they didn’t care enough; something good happened because 
their dedication was extraordinary. One important consequence of the proposed account is 
that responsibility for outcomes of collective action is a deeply normative matter. 
 
1 Joint moral responsibility without individual control 
Sometimes a number of individuals seem jointly morally responsible for events over which 
they, as individuals, had no control. Consider a simplified case: 
 
The Lake: Alice, Bill and Cecil each have a small boat in East Lake outside their 
town. One day last spring, each painted the boat and, unknown to the others, poured 
excess solvent into the lake. In the back of their heads, they all knew that this could 
affect the wildlife, but each of them decided that it would be a hassle to dispose of the 
solvent in a safe way and hoped that nothing bad would happen. However, as the 
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solvent from all three diffused throughout the lake over the next few days, its 
concentration became high enough everywhere to prevent micro-organisms in the 
lake from reproducing during the next few weeks, thus leaving higher organisms 
without food and effectively wiping out all fish in the lake. The concentration of 
solvent exceeded the threshold for the microorganisms by quite some margin: 
although the solvent from only one of the three would not have been enough to kill 
off the fish, the solvent from two would have. 
 
Let us assume that all three agents satisfied conditions of moral accountability. They were not 
being forced or manipulated to do what they did and they had both the capacity to reason and 
reflect on the values involved and the relevant sort of control over their own decisions and 
actions. Then it seems that we can rightly hold them responsible for recklessly pouring 
solvent into the lake. But to just about everyone that I have confronted with the case, it also 
seems clear that they are morally responsible for the death of the fish, that is, for an outcome 
of their actions over which they had no control as individuals. Similarly, it seems that voters 
can be morally responsible for the outcome of a referendum, citizens for toppling a dictatorial 
regime, consumers for good or bad practices of companies they patronize, and frequent flyers 
and drivers of SUVs for climate effects, even though, as individuals, they could not have 
significantly affected those outcomes, practices or effects. 
 The question of this paper concerns the conditions for such joint responsibility for 
outcomes of collective actions. In the next section, I explain why a case like The Lake 
provides difficulties for standard ways of understanding collective responsibility. In section 
three, I propose a preliminary analysis of joint responsibility based on variations on The Lake. 
To support this analysis, section four introduces the Explanation Hypothesis, a model of our 
concept of moral responsibility that was developed to account for various aspects of 
individual moral responsibility for decisions, actions and outcomes. In section five, I show 
how the Explanation Hypothesis subsumes and deepens the analysis of section three. In 
section six, finally, I suggest a way of turning the Explanation Hypothesis’ characterization of 
our concept of moral responsibility into an account of moral responsibility as such. One of the 
important consequences of the proposed account is that responsibility for outcomes of 
collective action is a deeply normative matter. 
 Some caveats are in order. First, the concern of this paper is moral, retrospective 
responsibility for events. Space prevents me from saying anything about the tight and 
interesting connections between this topic and other questions discussed under the heading of 
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“responsibility”—questions concerning legal liability, moral or legal obligations to ensure 
outcomes or to take responsibility for outcomes by compensating those harmed, and questions 
about what characterizes responsible persons, or responsible decision procedures. Second, 
since the concern is with joint responsibility of individual agents, I will not say anything 
about the claim that collectives can be responsible for an outcome when none of their 
members are. (For recent defences of “autonomous” corporate responsibility, see Arnold 
2006, Pettit 2007, Tännsjö 2007, Copp 2007; for criticism see Corlett 2001, Haji 2006, 
McKenna 2006, Miller 2007.) Third, the primary concern here is with outcome responsibility 
rather than responsibility for decisions. The conditions under which individuals are 
responsible for their decisions are themselves highly contestable, but I will assume that all 
individuals in the cases discussed are autonomous, in control of their own decisions and 
actions, capable of rational deliberation, suffering from no motivational maladies, and, as a 
result, responsible for their own acts or failures to act. Fourth, since our concern is with 
difficulties pertaining specifically to the understanding of how individuals are jointly 
responsible for outcomes, I will assume that other difficulties pertaining to outcome 
responsibility can be overcome, in particular the fact that outcomes often depend on factors 
outside the agent’s control. (For discussion, see Feinberg 1968: 681-82; Nagel 1976; Sverdlik 
1987: 74; May 1992: 42-45; Enoch and Marmor 2007 e.g.). Finally, although it is clear that 
individuals can be jointly responsible for good outcomes, I will follow most of the literature 
and focus on responsibility for bad outcomes. It should be clear, however, that the discussion 
generalizes to good outcomes. 
2 Difficulties 
As we shall see, neither the standard notion of individual responsibility for outcomes, nor 
typical strategies for making sense of collective moral responsibility explain the intuition that 
the agents in cases like The Lake are responsible for the outcomes in question. 
 On a standard conception, an individual agent is morally responsible for a harm to the 
extent that some morally faulty aspect of her behaviour played a significant causal role in 
producing that harm (Feinberg 1968: 674; May 1992: 15). The difficulty is to see how the 
reckless acts of the agents in The Lake play a significant causal role. 
 We have already noted that neither agent made any difference to the survival of the fish 
given the other acts, so significance cannot require such difference making. On the other hand, 
the solvent contributed by each agent was causally involved in bringing about the outcome. 
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But causal involvement cannot in itself be what accounts for individual responsibility for the 
collective outcome. Suppose that there are two solvents. Solvent X works as before, 
preventing microorganisms from reproducing, but it can do so by means of either of two 
distinct but equally powerful chemical processes, X1 and X2, depending on whether solvent 
Y is present. Solvent Y is itself incapable of doing any damage except in extreme 
concentrations, but will favour process X2 in the presence of solvent X. Suppose further that 
whereas Bill and Cecil poured solvent X into the lake, Alice contributed solvent Y, thus 
slightly changing the way the solvents from Bill and Cecil prevented micro-organisms from 
reproducing. Then it is not clear that she would be morally responsible for the outcome. 
 Intuitively, it might seem that the relevant causal involvement would have to be one of at 
least facilitating the causal process, or make it more likely to produce the outcome (cf. 
Petersson 2004). But while that might be true for responsibility for outcomes of individual 
actions, it is not required in The Lake. Suppose that when the concentration of solvent reaches 
above what would be provided by two polluters, the process by which the microorganisms are 
prevented from reproducing is both slowed down and made more open to possible 
disturbances, thus slightly decreasing the objective probability of the outcome. Then it is true 
of each of the polluters that he or she actually (but unwittingly) lowered the probability that 
the fish would die and obstructed that process to some degree, given the actual contribution 
from the other two. Nevertheless, the three polluters would still seem to be jointly responsible 
for the death of the fish; it still died because of their actions.  
 Now consider the corresponding case with only one agent involved:  
 
Adam’s Lake: Because of rare but naturally occurring processes, a poisonous 
substance is produced in the mud at the bottom of the lake. The amount would be just 
enough, by itself, to prevent the microorganisms from reproducing. Over the same 
period, Adam is painting his boat, recklessly pouring excess solvent into the lake that 
contains the very same poisonous substance. The overall result is that the lake 
contains more than enough to kill off the microorganisms. In fact, at this 
concentration, the processes preventing the reproduction are a little slower than they 
would have been if Adam had not disposed of his solvent this way. In the end, 
though, the microorganisms are wiped out. 
 
Though it is clear that Adam is morally responsible for recklessly pouring solvent into the 
lake, most people seem reluctant to say that he is responsible for the death of the fish. At the 
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very least, it was much clearer that Alice, Bill and Cecil were so responsible in The Lake. 
This strongly suggests that the responsibility attributed to the three is fundamentally 
collective. Taken together, the faulty behaviours of Alice, Bill and Cecil clearly played a 
significant causal role in wiping out the fish; individually, they did not.  
 The problem posed by The Lake for standard accounts of responsibility for outcomes of 
individual action is equally a problem for attempts, like that of Stephen Sverdlik (1987), to 
reduce collective or shared outcome responsibility to individual outcome responsibility. But it 
also poses a problem for standard attempts to understand forms of collective or shared 
responsibility, whether reductive or not. Since the most obvious cases in which we hold 
agents responsible for an outcome as a group are cases where they have either worked 
together towards some goal or failed to do so, such attempts are often cast in terms of actual 
or possible joint agency or joint intentions (Held 1970, Rescher 1998, Kutz 2000, Miller 
2006, Sadler 2006, Shockley 2007, e.g.). Less obvious and more controversial are cases 
where members of a community are responsible for outcomes of acts by other members 
because members empower and are empowered by each other, and thus “shares in what each 
member does, and … should feel responsible for what the other members do” (May 1992: 
11). 
 The Lake fits neither of these patterns. Since Alice, Bill and Cecil performed their acts 
independently and without knowledge of the others, they had no intentions to act together 
with the others. Nor is it likely that our ascription of joint responsibility relies on the 
assumption that they could reasonably have formed such intentions. Moreover, we have no 
reason to think that they form a group the members of which empower each other. For all we 
know, they might see each other as enemies. Still, they seem jointly morally responsible for 
the death of the fish.  
 What is clear from The Lake and similar examples is that a number of individuals can be 
jointly responsible for an outcome if, together, they play a significant causal role for that 
outcome. Structurally, this relation between the actions of the individuals and the outcome is 
similar to well-known attempts to analyse causes, not as necessary conditions or difference 
makers, but as non-redundant parts of nomically sufficient conditions for effects (Mackie 
1974; cf. Wright 1988). In The Lake, the actions of the three agents are pair-wise sufficient 
for the outcome, each action being a non-redundant part of such a pair. It might thus be 
tempting to explain the joint responsibility of the three agents in such terms (Braham and van 
Hees ms). Unfortunately, any such attempt will run into deep problems with cases of what 
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David Lewis (1986b) calls “causal preemption”. Suppose that instead of pouring solvent into 
East Lake, Alice built a contraption that monitored the concentration of solvent in the lake 
and set it to empty her bucket of solvent into the lake should the level not rise high enough to 
kill the fish. Since Bill and Cecil contributed enough solvent, Alice’s contraption was never 
triggered. In this case, she clearly would not be responsible for the outcome, even though her 
action would be a non-redundant part of sufficient conditions for the death of the fish (a 
condition that included her action and the contribution of either Bill or Cecil).1 
 Elsewhere I have defended a way for theories of causation dealing in sufficient conditions 
to adequately account for cases of causal preemption (Björnsson 2007). But something more 
would need to be said even with such an account at hand. The fact that Adam poured solvent 
into the lake was a non-redundant part of a sufficient condition for the death of the fish, 
together with the fact that some volume of mud at the bottom of the lake emitted the same 
amount of poisonous substance; yet Adam’s responsibility for that outcome is much less 
obvious than Alice’s, Bill’s and Cecil’s in The Lake. Apparently it matters whether the 
actions of other agents are involved; the fundamental problem of joint responsibility is why. 
This is where I hope to make progress.  
3 A preliminary analysis of responsibility for outcomes of collective action 
To understand joint responsibility, the first thing to be clear about is the required relation 
between the collective and the outcome for which they are responsible. As a first 
approximation, what is required seems to be that, together, the responsible agents play a 
significant role in the explanation of the outcome: the fish died because of Alice, Bill and 
Cecil. With some qualifications, this is very much in line with the idea that individual 
outcome responsibility requires that the individual’s behaviour played a significant causal role 
in the outcome. However, talk about causal (as opposed to explanatory) role suggests that the 
responsible parties brought about or produced the outcome rather than merely letting it 
happen, and we know that production is not required for outcome responsibility:  
 
                                                
1 Other problems are provided by probabilistic case where there are no causally sufficient conditions 
for outcomes, and so-called “switching” cases, where necessary parts of sufficient conditions seem to 
change the way an outcome happens without being causally responsible for it (cf. the case where Alice 
contributes solvent Y). These are also problems for counterfactual analyses in the tradition of David 
Lewis (1973); for discussion, see e.g. (Collins et al 2004; Björnsson 2007). 
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The Well: Eric, Fiona and George are spending a Sunday afternoon in the woods, 
each thinking that he or she is the only person within miles. Suddenly they hear cries 
for help coming from an area with especially dense vegetation. Although the cries are 
disturbing and continues for a long while, each ignores them while thinking that they 
could be part of a prank, or that whatever might be going on is none of their business. 
Had they walked in the direction of the cries, however, they would have found a 
woman, Hannah, who had accidentally fallen into a partially overgrown old well but 
was hanging onto a ledge a meter or so down, screaming for help and slowly losing 
her grip. Since no one came to her help, Hannah eventually fell down into the dried 
up well and died as she hit the rocks at the bottom. The story could have ended 
differently, however. One person would not have been able to pull her up without 
help, but had any two of those who heard her cries come to her rescue, they would 
have been able to save her. 
 
It seems that if they learned the truth of what happened, Eric, Fiona and George could rightly 
blame themselves for not having investigated the call closer. But it also seems that they are to 
some extent morally responsible for the fatal outcome of the accident (though not, of course, 
for the accident itself), and they certainly seem responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t 
saved. They could have saved her, but they did not. As in The Lake, the responsibility 
involved seems to be essentially collective. In a version of The Well—Esther’s Well—Esther 
is the only person in place to hear Hannah’s cries. Like Eric, she ignores the cries for dubious 
reasons; like Eric she would have been unable to save Hannah even if she had responded. But 
whereas Eric, Fiona and George seemed clearly responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t 
saved, Esther clearly is not. Esther’s Well highlights the essentially joint nature of Eric’s, 
Fiona’s and George’s responsibility in The Well, just as Adam’s Lake did in relation to The 
Lake. 
 In The Well, unlike in The Lake, there is a sense in which none of the three were involved 
in the process leading to the final outcome: indeed, it seems that they could all have been 
absent and nothing in that process would have been different (ignoring minute differences in 
the gravitational field and the like). Nevertheless, it seems that their inaction explains why 
Hannah wasn’t saved. This is the notion of “explaining why” that seems relevant for our 
ordinary attribution of moral responsibility in these cases. 
 Thus far I have suggested that the agents should play a significant role in the explanation 
of the outcome. But more needs to be said about the required sort of involvement. As we have 
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already seen from The Well, the relevant involvement need not consist of any particular sort 
of positive intentional action: perhaps Eric was sitting on a rock, Fiona climbing a tree, and 
George running across a meadow instead of helping Hannah. Similarly, no decisions on part 
of members of the group need to be involved in the explanation. Perhaps none of the three 
even considered the possibility of finding out whether they could help; perhaps they just 
noted, absent-mindedly, that someone seemed to be in need of help but failed to see any 
reason to take action. That would not seem to remove their responsibility as long as they 
could have considered the possibility to help, and would have done so if they had cared more 
about the needs of others. That no decision is needed can be made even clearer with a case 
involving negligent ignorance where there is no awareness of risk involved. Suppose that 
Alice, Bill and Cecil poured the solvent into the lake while being unaware of its lethal 
potential. They could still be responsible for the outcome if the reason they were unaware was 
that they lacked concern for the environment or for taking in relevant information, and if that 
explained why they failed to react to the warning signs on the cans of solvent. 
 In all these variations, we might say that some morally “faulty” aspect of behaviour 
explains the outcome, but the behaviour seems faulty only because it is explained by the 
wrong sensitivity to values, or the wrong motivational structure. If Alice, Bill and Cecil were 
ignorant of the solvent’s lethal potential due to other factors than a lack of appropriate 
concern, their responsibility for the death of the fish is undermined. Similarly, suppose that 
George was wearing headphones and did not hear Hannah’s cries for help. Or suppose that he 
heard the cries and started walking towards the well but was trapped by impenetrable 
vegetation blocking his way and delaying him until it was too late. In neither case would he 
seem to be responsible for the outcome. The best explanation for that, it seems, is that in these 
cases, unlike in the original scenario, George’s concern or lack of concern fails to explain 
why he didn’t reach the well in time. 
 Another thing to notice is that the outcome needs to be explained by the motivational 
structure in a “normal” way. If Dave finds out that Alice, Bill and Cecil lack appropriate 
concern for the environment and draconically proceeds to poison their lake to teach them a 
lesson, their lack of concern might be part of the explanation of the death of the fish in the 
lake, but they are not thereby morally responsible for it. Similarly, if George’s lack of concern 
for others had made him ignore a discussion of feasible paths through the forest, and if as a 
result he was stuck in the mud and unable to heed Hannah’s call, it is not clear that he is 
thereby morally responsible for not having come to her rescue. 
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 Judging from the variations of The Lake and The Well, it seems that the two groups of 
people are responsible for the outcomes because the outcomes are explained (in a “normal” 
way) by the agents’ motivational structures. The fish died because Alice, Bill and Cecil 
lacked appropriate concern for the environment; Hannah’s accident had a fatal outcome 
because Eric, Fiona and George lacked appropriate concern for their fellow human beings. 
The same seems to hold for cases of moral responsibility for good outcomes. Suppose that 
each member of a trio discovers and mends a leaking sewer out of concern for the 
environment and that the reduction of pollution secured by any two of them would have been 
enough to save the fish in the nearby lake, but not the reduction secured by only one agent. 
Then it would seem reasonable to say that the fish survived because these three individuals 
cared about the environment, and they would seem to be correspondingly (jointly) responsible 
for that outcome. 
 The question remains, however, whether we can expect this analysis to survive still 
further variations, and whether it generalizes to other cases of collective responsibility. 
Moreover, we have yet to explain why the individuals are jointly responsible for the 
outcomes, given this diagnosis. It is one thing to say that the group is responsible, another to 
say that the members of the group are, and it might be thought that attributions of moral 
responsibility in cases like these involve some kind of mistake. Perhaps our desire to hold 
someone responsible prompts us to confusedly assign joint responsibility for outcomes on the 
ground that (a) each individual is responsible for wrongfully risking some bad effect—an 
adverse environmental effects, say—and (b) what they risked actually took place because of 
these wrongdoings, taken collectively. The suspicion that there is something amiss with our 
judgments gains force from a comparison of Alice’s responsibility in The Lake and Adam’s in 
Adam’s Lake. In spite of performing identical actions the upshots of which are causally 
involved in bringing about the death of the fish in the same way, and in spite of the fact that 
their actions result from identical motivational structures, Alice’s responsibility was much 
clearer than Adam’s. And in spite of acting in the very same way as Esther for the very same 
reasons and having exactly the same possibility to save Hannah—none—, only Eric seemed 
responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t saved. This is bound to strike some readers as 
arbitrary.2  
                                                
2 See (Zimmerman 1985, p. 116-17) for an argument that seems to assume that differences of this sort 
cannot make for different degrees of responsibility. 
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 I address these issues in the next three sections. Section four introduces an independently 
motivated hypothesis about our concept of individual retrospective moral responsibility, the 
Explanation Hypothesis. In section five, I explain how it subsumes the analysis of joint 
responsibility developed in this section. This gives us reason to think that our present analysis 
will generalize to further cases. Moreover, it suggests that the different attributions of 
responsibility to Alice and Adam are no more arbitrary than attributions of outcome 
responsibility in general. Although the Explanation Hypothesis is primarily an empirical 
hypothesis about our concept of responsibility, supported by its predictive power, it strongly 
suggests an account of moral responsibility. In section six, finally, I introduce that account—
Explanatory Responsibility—and discuss how it makes issues of outcome responsibility 
deeply normative. 
4 The Explanation Hypothesis  
In two recent papers (Björnsson and Persson 2009, ms), Karl Persson and I have argued that a 
wide variety of intuitions about individual responsibility for decisions, actions and outcomes 
can be explained if we understand our concept of moral responsibility as shaped by our 
interest in holding people responsible. What follows is a brief and simplified version of that 
story. 
 People hold each other responsible for a variety of events in a variety of ways. We blame 
or express indignation towards people who have brought about or failed to prevent something 
bad for lack of proper concern, and praise or express moral admiration towards those who 
have brought about or let happen something good at remarkable costs to themselves. 
Sometimes our expressions of so-called “reactive” attitudes are as simple as a frown or a 
smile. At other times we are more elaborate, punishing or demanding explanation or 
compensation, or distributing rewards and honours. And we direct analogues of all these 
reactions towards ourselves. 
 Our interest in holding people responsible is largely an interest in shaping motivational 
structures—values, preferences, behavioural and emotional habits, etc—in order to promote 
or prevent certain kinds of actions or events that we like or dislike. Consciously or 
unconsciously, we often hold ourselves and each other responsible for various outcomes so 
that we will behave responsibly and take into account possible outcomes of the sort that we 
have been held responsible for. This is not to deny that we often hold people responsible for 
reasons of desert, without an eye to deterring or encouraging agents or third parties. The claim 
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is merely that general reformative interests very much drive and shape our practices of 
holding people responsible. (For instance, consider the way expressions of indignation are 
placated when agents express regret and real motivation to avoid repeats, and consider 
plausible evolutionary rationales for our reactive attitudes.) 
 In order for our practices of holding people responsible to reliably affect outcomes in this 
way, they need to be targeted at motivational structures of types that are a) systematically tied 
to those outcomes and b) tend to be amenable to modification when targeted by these 
practices, and need to be so when instances of the motivational structure type c) explain the 
outcome in a salient straightforward way that supports learning.  
 Undoubtedly, our concept of moral responsibility plays a central role in determining 
whom to hold responsible for what. In particular, expressions of indignation and requests for 
explanation are withheld when we conclude that the putative target of these practices was not 
responsible for the objectionable decision, action or outcome. Since our concept of moral 
responsibility plays this role, it would not be surprising if it has been shaped by the need to 
identify proper targets for our practices of holding people responsible, identified by 
conditions a) through c) above.3 
 This provides motivation for what we call the “Explanation Hypothesis”, an empirical 
hypothesis about the conditions under which we take people to be responsible for some event:  
  
The Explanation Hypothesis: People take P to be morally responsible for E to the 
extent that they take4 E to be an outcome of a type O and take P to have a 
motivational structure S of type M such that GET, RR and ER hold: 
 
General Explanatory Tendency (GET): Type M motivational structures are part of a 
reasonably common sort of significant explanation of type O outcomes. 
 
                                                
3 In connecting moral responsibility to reactive attitudes and practices of holding responsible, this 
hypothesis is closely related to a category of accounts starting with Peter Strawson’s (1962) paper 
“Freedom and Resentment”. In (Björnsson and Persson ms) we indcate how our particular way of 
spelling out this connection avoids some of the standard objections raised against such accounts. 
4 In saying that people “take” GET, RR and ER to hold, I do not mean that they are consciously aware 
of the considerations defined by these conditions in making their judgments of responsibility under 
these descriptions, only that judgments are in fact determined by such considerations. 
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Reactive Response-ability (RR): Type M motivational structures tend to respond in 
the right way to agents being held responsible for realizing or not preventing type O 
outcomes. 
 
Explanatory Responsibility (ER): S is part of a significant explanation of E of the sort 
mentioned in GET. 
 
My focus here will be on the two explanatory requirements, GET and, in particular, ER, but a 
few words are needed to avoid misunderstanding of RR. It is meant to capture the idea that 
certain types of motivational structures are impervious to blame, praise or other practices of 
holding people responsible, and that this undermines moral responsibility. RR thus explains 
why we typically take moral responsibility to be diminished when behaviour is driven by 
compulsion, phobias, severe personality disorders and extreme stress. 
 Since RR concerns how motivational structures respond to blame, praise, etc., it is easy to 
think that the Explanation Hypothesis understands judgments of moral responsibility as 
forward-looking, concerned with whether holding someone responsible would reform her 
behaviour. That would be a misunderstanding, however. The fact that someone’s motivational 
structure is of a type that tends to respond in the right way does not mean that it is likely to do 
so in this case. A particular instance of a type that tends to respond appropriately might be 
resist reform: disdain might satisfy RR, but disdain for morality might be self-protecting. 
Moreover, various extraneous factors might mask the motivational structure’s disposition to 
react in the right way: perhaps the agent is disposed to react adversely to criticism, say, or 
perhaps she suffered from a stroke immediately after her action and no longer has the 
cognitive capacity to understand what she is held responsible for. To be directly forward-
looking, judgments of moral responsibility would have to be sensitive to such masks, but they 
clearly are not; they are essentially backward-looking, concerned with what explained the 
outcome in question. 
 Among motivational states and outcomes that satisfy RR, there are basically two kinds of 
explanation that also satisfy GET: First, events are often explained by the fact that we want 
them sufficiently, as our desires guide our goal-directed cognitive mechanisms (“The trial was 
all due to Dr. Ortega’s relentless passion for justice”; “Her tragic death was due to Mr. Inza’s 
obsession with revenge”). Second, the fact that we do not sufficiently want something not to 
happen often explains why we let it happen (“The new factory was allowed to pollute the 
river because the CEO didn’t care about the environment”; “He missed his daughter’s game 
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because he cared more about his work than about her”).5 Consequently, we take people to be 
responsible for a bad outcome when we think that it happened because they wanted them 
(“Mr. Inza is to blame for her death”) or because they didn’t care enough to prevent them 
(“The pollution is the CEO’s fault”), and take people to be responsible for a good outcome 
when it happened because they wanted it (“Dr. Ortega deserves all credit for the trial”).6 
 According to the Explanation Hypothesis, our everyday concept of an explanation why 
something happened is at the core of our thinking about moral responsibility. One key feature 
of that concept is that it is highly selective. Suppose that a house has just burned down and 
that we are asked why. In answering, we could list a number of conditions, each of which 
might be a necessary part of complex sufficient condition for the outcome: there was a 
thunderstorm, the house was hit by lightning an hour earlier, the house consisted largely of 
combustible matter, there was oxygen in the air, etc.7 All of these conditions, and countless 
more, might be part of a full causal story leading up to the fact that the house burned down, 
but only a small subset will stand out when we want to give a condensed explanation of that 
fact. When we do, the fact that the house was hit by lightning will likely grab our attention, 
whereas the fact that the house consisted of combustible matter or that there was oxygen in 
the air would be taken for granted as part of what we might call the explanatory 
“background”. Typically, the explanatory background consists of conditions that are generally 
to be expected whereas attention grabbers are conditions that violate such expectations. 
                                                
5 It is an interesting question whether GET-satisfying explanations require awareness on part of the 
agent that the sort of outcome in question might take place or whether it can be enough that the person 
would have been aware and acted on the information if the person had possessed a different 
motivational structure. We are currently investigating this, and preparatory studies suggest that most 
people come down on the latter side. For some of the philosophical controversy, see (Zimmerman 
2008, ch. 4; Sher 2009). 
6 It is possible that GET should be restricted to these two broad kinds of explanation. 
7 In (Björnsson 2007) I argue that our causal reasoning is primarily directed towards sufficient rather 
than necessary conditions and that this is explained by the connection between causal thinking and 
instrumental reasoning: instrumental reasoning is primarily directed at ensuring certain states of affairs 
rather than making them possible. The priority of sufficiency over necessity explains why causation is 
compatible with many varieties of overdetermination and ultimately explains why responsibility is not 
a matter of difference making. (All this simplifies matters by ignoring probabilistic causation and 
explanation.)  
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Generally speaking, we expect houses to be built from some amount of combustible material, 
and we certainly expect there to be oxygen in the air, but we do not in the same way expect 
houses to be hit by lightning at some given time. 
 Our everyday notion of explanation is selective in another way too. The bolt of lightning 
that hit the house itself had a causal genesis, and there were numerous causal intermediaries 
between the fact that the house was hit by lightning and the fact that it burned to the ground. 
These conditions are not likely to be seen as part of the explanans, however. When we 
provide explanations of an event, we cite a condition that we take to provide a particularly 
telling explanation among those leading up to that event, a condition that satisfies our 
explanatory interests without immediately raising new and urgent why-questions. If we 
wonder why the house burned down and are told that the attic insulation caught fire, we will 
probably wonder why the insulation caught fire, and if we are told that there was a separation 
of positive and negative charges in the neighbouring atmosphere, we are likely to ask how 
that explained that the house burned down. By contrast, if we are told that the house was hit 
by lightning, we will probably be satisfied: we take a house’s being hit by lightning to be both 
the sort of thing that just happens and the sort of thing that causes houses to burn down.  
 When condition ER in the Explanation Hypothesis refers to a significant explanation, that 
means an explanation that satisfies our explanatory interests and background assumptions or, 
differently put, fits our explanatory frame. The selective nature of significant explanations 
makes the Explanation Hypothesis a surprisingly powerful account of judgments of moral 
responsibility. Obviously, the hypothesis can account for the fact that we take people to be 
responsible for most intended outcomes of their actions: because of our powerful goal-
directed mechanisms, such outcomes are straightforwardly explained with reference to what 
we want to achieve, and most of our everyday preferences satisfy RR. But relying on the 
selective nature of significant explanations it also provides a unifying account of how a wide 
variety of otherwise disparate phenomena affect judgments of responsibility. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Björnsson and Persson 2009; ms), it explains why we take it that (a) external 
force, (b) threats and (c) ignorance mitigate moral responsibility to various degrees, as well as 
why we take it that (d) those who actively participate in the production of an outcome have a 
higher degree of responsibility for it than those who merely allow others do it, that 
(e) someone who takes initiative is more responsible than someone who tags along, and that 
(f) agents are more responsible for known negative than for known positive side-effects that 
the agent does not care about. It also explains why judgments of responsibility tend to be 
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undermined by considerations suggesting that (g) our decisions are a matter of luck, (h) our 
actions are, ultimately, the upshots of events over which we have no control, or (i) our 
behaviour can be given reductionistic, mechanistic explanations, as well as why (j) the felt 
conflict between determinism and moral responsibility is lessened when people consider 
concrete cases, and especially cases involving grave moral transgressions. 
5 The Explanation Hypothesis and collective responsibility 
The explanatory power of the Explanation Hypothesis, along with its etiological motivation, 
gives us reason to think that the everyday concept of retrospective moral responsibility has a 
structure that straightforwardly incorporates our preliminary analysis of joint responsibility in 
section three: In cases of joint responsibility, the motivational structures of all participants are 
seen as parts of a significant explanation of the outcome. This gives us independent reason to 
expect further cases of joint responsibility to conform to the same analysis, thus providing a 
first answer to the generalization worry.  
 More specifically, the Explanation Hypothesis explains both why we take the agents of 
The Lake to be responsible for the death of the fish and why we take them to be jointly 
responsible. We see them as responsible for the outcome because the three conditions GET, 
RR and ER are satisfied for each of them, and we see them as are jointly responsible because 
their motivational structures are part of a significant explanans only taken together with the 
motivational structures of the other two. 
 Start with the last claim. Compare the following two answers to the question: why did the 
fish in the lake die? 
 
(1) Alice, Bill and Cecil didn’t care about the environmental effects of their 
actions. 
(2) Alice didn’t care about the environmental effects of her actions.  
 
Whereas (1) sounds like a perfectly good explanation, (1) is clearly problematic, for two 
reasons. First it brings attention to the fact that Alice’s carelessness made no difference to the 
outcome because there would have been enough solvent in the lake without it, and although 
difference making doesn’t always undermine explanatory claims it might do so in this case.8 
                                                
8 The model of causal judgment developed in (Björnsson 2007) explains the restricted role of 
difference making or counterfactual dependence in causal judgments and shows why the lack of 
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But (2) is also problematic because it focuses on Alice at the exclusion of Bill and Cecil who 
played exactly the same role in killing off the fish. Both these defects are absent in (1). That 
the trio didn’t care about the environmental effects of their actions straightforwardly 
explained why they poured solvent into the lake, and the resulting concentration of solvent 
explained why the fish died. Of course, not all their actions or all the solvent was needed for 
that outcome, but there is no privileged subset of these actions that would provide a better 
explanans. For example, if we explained the death of the fish by mentioning the carelessness 
of Alice and Bill, we would misleadingly suggest that Cecil had less to do with the outcome 
than the other two. For that reason, such a restricted explanans would not provide us with an 
acceptable straightforward explanation.  
 Now consider the claim that the motivational structure of each agent satisfies GET, RR 
and ER for the outcome in question. First, it satisfies GET because the outcome is explained 
by a lack of concern to avoid that sort of outcome in the normal way. The most common 
explanation of this type will be one in which an individual’s lack of concern explains the 
outcome, but we frequently explain outcomes in terms of attitudes of members of a group: 
“The kids next door play loud music because they don’t care about the neighbours”; “Sweden 
rejected the Euro because many Swedes were afraid of losing political independence”; etc. 
Second, the motivational structures also satisfy RR: we have assumed that the individuals 
involved satisfy conditions needed for individual responsibility for decisions and action. 
Finally, we have just seen that the individual agent’s motivational structure satisfies ER, as it 
is alluded to in the joint explanation given by (1). 
 Contrast this case with Adam’s Lake. Just like Alice’s lack of environmental concern, 
taken on its own, Adam’s lack of concern does not itself strike us as straightforwardly 
explaining the death of the fish. But whereas Alice’s is part of a significant explanation that 
satisfies ER, expressed in (1), it is not clear that Adam’s is. For example, the following 
answer to the question of why the fish died in Adam’s Lake seems strained: 
 
(3) Adam didn’t care about the environment and a poisonous substance was 
produced at the bottom of the lake. 
 
Although both conjuncts mention conditions that are part of a complete causal explanation of 
                                                
counterfactual dependence might undermine the claim that Alice’s carelessness caused or explained 
the death of the fish in the lake. This effect would be even stronger in the version of The Lake where 
her contribution actually lowered the probability of the outcome. 
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the death of the fish, their conjunction does not form the most salient explanation of the 
outcome. It would be considerably more natural to appeal to the fact that the lake was 
poisoned, as the causes of the poisoning are diverse. Moreover, among those causes, the fact 
that a poisonous substance was produced at the bottom of the lake would be seen as more 
significant than Adam’s contribution, since it actually made a difference to the outcome.  
 Intuitions about The Well are explained almost exactly as intuitions about The Lake. Eric, 
Fiona and George are seen as jointly responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t saved 
because it is naturally explained with reference to their lack of concern, but not with reference 
to, say, Eric’s lack of concern in particular. The defect of an explanation singling out one 
individual is more strongly marked than in The Lake. “Why wasn’t Hannah saved?” “Because 
Eric didn’t care to see whether he could help!” The answer invites the reply that Eric couldn’t 
have saved Hannah on his own, and does so even more strongly than (1) invited the reply that 
the fish would have died without Alice’s action: at least Alice’s action was directly causally 
involved in blocking the reproduction of the microorganisms whereas Eric’s inaction made no 
definite difference at all.9 (This explanatory inadequacy is of course even more accentuated in 
Esther’s Well, where Esther’s lack of care clearly does not explain why Hannah wasn’t 
saved.) 
 What we have seen, then, is how the Explanation Hypothesis supports the diagnosis of 
joint responsibility provided in section three. Given that so many other aspects of our thinking 
about moral responsibility is well understood given this account, we should expect further 
variations on the cases discussed here to conform to the same pattern. 
 For similar reasons, we should hesitate before saying that typical intuitions about cases 
like The Lake result from confusedly attributing joint responsibility based on (i) individual 
responsibility for decisions and actions and (ii) non-distributive collective responsibility for 
an outcome, that is, collective responsibility that does not imply corresponding responsibility 
                                                
9 The Explanation Hypothesis also implies that subtle differences in characterizations of outcomes 
might yield different verdicts about moral responsibility. It is intuitively clear that Eric, Fiona and 
George are responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t saved, but it is less clear that they are 
responsible for her death. If we ask why she wasn’t saved, it is natural to cite, say, the trio’s lack of 
concern, but if we ask why she died, it is considerably more natural to cite the fact that she fell into an 
old well or didn’t watch where she was going than to cite our non-intervention. Different explananda 
yield different explanatory frames: unlike the fact that she died, the fact that she wasn’t saved implies 
that she was in danger, thus relegating her initial fall into the well into the explanatory background. 
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for members of the collective. The argument given here suggests that intuitions of joint 
responsibility rely on the same sort of considerations as do intuitions about individual 
responsibility. From the point of view of our concept of retrospective moral outcome 
responsibility, then, the attribution of joint responsibility is in no way arbitrary. Nor is it 
arbitrary, from an etiological point of view, that we should have a concept that yields this 
pattern of judgments; a focus on cases with a straightforward explanatory connection between 
suitable motivational structures and outcomes is crucial for the sort of moral reform that much 
of our everyday practice of holding people responsible is aimed at. One might worry, though, 
that it is unfair that Alice should be held responsible (together with Bill and Cecil) for the 
death of the fish whereas Adam is not, given that both were equally reckless and contributed 
solvents that were similarly causally involved in processes leading to the death of the fish. 
But this is a familiar problem for outcome responsibility in general, not specifically for joint 
responsibility or for the analysis proposed here. Factors outside the control of an agent are 
part of what determines the outcome of her behaviour: only one of two equally reckless 
drivers is responsible for the death of a child, because only one had a child run out into the 
street in front of him; only one of two equally courageous and skilled lifeguards is responsible 
for having saved a life, because only one had the opportunity.  
 One prediction of the Explanation Hypothesis is that people might be seen as jointly 
rather than individually responsible for an outcome even in cases where each individual could 
have prevented the outcome. Think of a version of The Well where any one of Eric, Fiona and 
George could have saved Hannah using a winch next to the well. We might still be reluctant 
to say that Eric is responsible for the fact that Hannah wasn’t saved because it arbitrarily 
picks out Eric at the exclusion of the other two. The significant explanans is still that none of 
the three cared enough to go see whether help was needed; that corresponds to the most 
natural assignment of responsibility, namely jointly, to all of them. 
 Another prediction, borne out by almost every discussion of distributive collective 
responsibility, is that we will ascribe joint responsibility in many cases where agents act 
together, with joint intentions, since these tend to be cases where agents’ motivational 
structures are involved in straightforwardly explaining the intended outcome. Similarly, 
intuitions about corporate responsibility bear out the prediction that we will ascribe moral 
responsibility for outcomes to corporations (organizations, nations, clubs) insofar as we take 
them to have structures that both straightforwardly explain their actions or omissions and 
corresponding outcomes and are open to modification by practices of holding these 
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corporations responsible (see e.g. French 1984; May and Stacey 1991). 
 For both cases of joint action and cases of corporate moral responsibility, the Explanation 
Hypothesis predicts attributions of quite different degrees of responsibility to different 
members of a collective that are causally involved in producing or failing to prevent some 
outcome. For example, we might think that a stream has been polluted because a certain 
company doesn’t care about the environment, but we do not thereby think that the janitor at 
the company headquarters is responsible for the pollution. He might have somehow facilitated 
the process leading to the pollution, but his motivation is not thereby part of a significant 
explanation in the way that the motivational structures of the CEO or members of the board 
are likely to be. And the same might be true about a member of the board who voted against 
the polluting activity, or even about someone who voted for it because she thought that that 
was the way to minimize the harm by allowing her to minimize the resulting pollution. 
6 Explanatory Responsibility and the normativity of retrospective outcome 
responsibility 
As we have seen, the Explanation Hypothesis promises a unified account of our judgments of 
individual and collective responsibility, an account that sees our ascription of essentially joint 
responsibility in cases like The Lake or The Well as integral to our thinking about moral 
responsibility in general. Moreover, although it does not say what the relation of moral 
responsibility is, it strongly suggests such an account. Given the Explanation Hypothesis’ 
account of our concept of moral responsibility, it might seem reasonable to simply assume 
that the relation of moral responsibility corresponds to what is identified when the concept is 
applied without any mistakes, that is, when GET, RR and ER hold. 
 Things are not quite that simple, however, because the selective nature of our explanatory 
judgments makes them sensitive to differences in explanatory frames. For example, it seems 
that when people are encouraged to abstract away from the level of detail that we employ in 
everyday explanations of actions and to focus on causal factors outside our control, they are 
less inclined to find motivational structures explanatorily significant, and less inclined to 
ascribe responsibility (Björnsson and Persson 2009, ms). In the same way, explanatory 
judgments often depend on normative expectations or ideals. Suppose that that a child falls 
and breaks an arm during some rough and tumble play. A person who thinks that mothers 
ought to be strongly protective of their children is more likely to explain this fact with 
reference to the mother’s lack of protective concern, and thus more likely to take the mother 
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to be responsible for the accident.10 
 If the Explanation Hypothesis captures out concept of moral responsibility and if there is 
a determinate, objective, truth of the matter as to whether people are moral responsible for 
certain outcomes, the “significant explanations” referred to in GET and ER needs to be 
restricted. The most obvious way to do so is to require that they are significant relative to a 
correct explanatory frame: relative to correct normative ideals, correct background 
assumptions, and relevant explanatory interests and explanatory perspectives. “Objectifying” 
the Explanation Hypothesis, we would thus get the following characterization of moral 
responsibility: 
 
Explanatory Responsibility: P is morally responsible for E to the extent that E is an 
outcome of a type O and P has a motivational structure S of type M such that GET, 
RR and ER hold relative to a correct explanatory frame. 
 
Obviously, Explanatory Responsibility only implies determinate judgments of responsibility 
given substantial assumptions about what the correct explanatory frames are. This is not the 
place to defend some such assumptions,11 but the fact that moral responsibility would depend 
on the correctness of normative expectations is itself a highly significant consequence.12 
Because of it, fundamental issues in normative ethics are directly relevant to questions of 
moral responsibility. 
 As an example, consider how issues of joint responsibility are affected by the 
disagreement about the existence of reasons to do one’s own part in a cooperative scheme 
even when others are known not to, or to “keep one’s own hands clean”. Thus far, I have 
discussed cases where, for all the agents knew, their acts could have made a difference 
individually to the outcome for which they are responsible. Moreover, this feature might seem 
essential to the cases. For example, if Alice had poured solvent into the lake knowing for sure 
that it would make no significant environmental difference or even slowed down ongoing 
                                                
10 For empirical data illustrating some effects of normative expectations on explanatory judgments, see 
e.g. (Alicke 1992), (Knobe and Fraser 2008), (Hitchcock and Knobe ms) and (Sytsma et al ms). 
11 In (Björnsson and Persson ms) we argue that explanatory frames of the sort that motivate most of 
our everyday judgments of moral responsibility should be preferred to the frames that are induced by 
sceptical arguments against moral responsibility. 
12 For related discussions of how normative aspects affect judgments of responsibility, see (Smiley 
1992). 
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damage, that could clearly undermine her responsibility for the death of the fish as her 
contribution would no longer be explained with reference to a lack of care. But suppose that 
there are moral reasons for people to do their part in appropriate cooperative schemes that do 
not depend on the possibility of actually significantly furthering the ultimate point of these 
schemes. Then people might be jointly responsible for bad outcomes that they, as individuals, 
knew they could not prevent: if they had all been more concerned to do their part, the outcome 
would have been different. 
 If there are non-consequentialist reasons of this sort, their strength will also have major 
impact on what we are responsible for. Given high enough normative expectations that people 
should avoid working for or purchase the goods of organizations that are responsible for 
certain bad outcomes, it will seem that great many people without direct causal influence on 
these outcomes are nevertheless responsible for them, i. e. for such things as the effects of a 
company’s environmental policy, the persecution of members of organized labour in 
undemocratic countries, or the enactment of severe oppression of civilians on occupied 
territories. After all, if people had cared more and been more “principled”, many such things 
could have been very different. This in turn raises difficult questions about the relation 
between normative expectation and psychological realism: since it seems unlikely that people 
will live up to these expectations under present circumstances, are they really reasonable? If 
correct, the Explanation Account makes clear just how such questions are central to issues of 
collective responsibility, by being directly relevant for the identification of significant 
explanations.13  
                                                
13 Earlier versions of this text have been presented and received valuable input at the International 
Conference on Moral Responsibility in Delft, August 2009, the Centre for Applied Ethics at Linköping 
University, the Department of Political Science and the Department of Philosophy, Linguistic and 
Theory of Science at University of Gothenburg, and the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. I 
am also grateful to participants at the CEU 2009 summer school on moral responsibility, and to 
comments from Ibo van de Poel and an anonymous reviewer for this volume. 
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